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Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. 
This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different 
levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the 
judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials 
and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary 
can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it 
reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower 
level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. 
We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result. 
JEL Code: H11, K40. 
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 1 Introduction
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in both developing and developed countries.
Not surprisingly, economists have devoted substantial attention to the study of the
determinants, as well as the eﬀects of corruption (see for instance Rose-Ackerman
1978, Klitgaard 1988 and Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
A question which has recently attracted attention in the empirical literature is how
the degree to which the judiciary is dependent of the government aﬀects corruption
(Ades and Di Tella 1997 and La Porta et al. 2004). These studies show that dependent
judiciaries typically increase corruption, but little has been done in the theoretical
literature on the topic.1
In this paper, we oﬀer a theory showing that the structure of the judiciary will de-
termine the level of corruption at diﬀerent levels of the government administration. We
ﬁnd that an independent judiciary, even though highly corrupt, may reduce corruption.
Previous literature on corruption and institutional design has typically focused on
corruption at the lower level of government and taken the higher level to be benevolent
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993 and Banerjee 1996). However, available empirical evidence
suggests that both high-level politicians and judiciaries commonly abuse power in their
own interest. To get an idea of the extent of corruption within judiciaries, we exam-
i n ear e c e n tW o r l dB a n ks u r v e yi nw h i c hﬁrms in 71 countries answer to the question
“In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be Hon-
est/Uncorrupt”.2 On a scale where 1 denotes “always” and 6 denotes “never” the
answering score is, on average, 3.65, which implies that the judiciaries, in fact, are
closer to being “dishonest/corrupt” than “honest/uncorrupted”.3
1Ades and di Tella (1997) show this in cross-country regressions using diﬀerent indexes of cor-
ruption. La Porta et al. (2004) ﬁnd that independent judiciaries reduce the number of steps that
as t a r t - u pﬁrm has to comply with in order to start operating legaly. In addition, La Porta et al.
(1999) and Djankov et al. (2002) show that compared to common law countries, civil law countries
(which tend to have more dependent judiciaries (La Porta el al. 2004)) have worse regulation and
more bureaucratic delays.
2The World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey 1997 “Measuring Conditions for Business
Operation and Growth”.
3We ﬁrst calculate the average of the ﬁrms’ answers in each country and then the overall average
of this.
2In order to study how diﬀerent types of judiciaries aﬀect corruption it is therefore
important to understand the interaction of diﬀerent levels of government with respect
to corruption. To do this we introduce a model where oﬃcials sell government goods,
such as permits or import licenses, and where all agents, i.e., a central authority (e.g. a
president, minister, etc.), a judiciary and oﬃcials, are assumed to act solely in their own
interests. The central authority can either extract rents up front or ex post. Up-front
collection is costly due to ex-ante auction ineﬃciencies and ex-post collection is costly
because oﬃcials may steal.4 The judiciary’s role is to ﬁnd out if theft has occurred and
to implement the sentence.
In line with North and Weingast (1989), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta
et al. (2004) we deﬁne an independent judiciary as one that can rule against the
central authority. In particular, it can avoid reporting theft to the central authority in
exchange for taking bribes from stealing oﬃcials.5 Theft is therefore common in this
system, which lead the central authority to extract rents through up-front collection,
by way of allowing oﬃcials to earn large rents, rather than collecting fees ex post.
A dependent judiciary, in contrast, can be fully controlled by the central authority,
which uses its coercive power to penalize oﬃcials harshly. To exploit the fact that
theft is scarce the central authority adopts ex-post collection of rents, which reduces
corruption on the part of the oﬃcials along with increasing corruption on part of the
central authority.
We argue that the structure of the judiciary may also aﬀect the central authority’s
choice of competition among oﬃcials. The degree of competition is determined by
the trade-oﬀ between the amounts of rents the central authority can extract up-front
when selling the oﬃce and ex post when collecting variable fees. If the judiciary is
dependent, then competition among oﬃcials may be used by the central authority to
4An illustrative example of our model showing how corruption at diﬀerent levels occur interdepen-
dently is given by Wade (1982) who studies the strategic corrupt usage of a canal irrigation system in
India in the early 1980s. Under this system, farmers consistently had to bribe lower level oﬃcials in
o r d e rt od i r e c tw a t e rt ot h e i rﬁelds. Well aware of the surplus this created, the minister in charge of
irrigation used a two-part tariﬀ system to extract rents. First, ex ante, potential oﬃcials had to make
up-front payments in order to become an oﬃcial and then they paid additional fees during tenure.
5Russia of today is an example of this mechanism where inﬂuence by regional governments over
courts is the central problem of the rule of law (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002).
3expand ex-post revenues. Again, because a dependent judiciary reduces the probability
of theft it increases the central authority’s proﬁts whereas it squeezes oﬃcials’ rents.6
In sum, an independent judiciary generates large rents for oﬃcials through the
low penalty they pay for theft whereas the central authority beneﬁts from a dependent
judiciary, which uses a harsher penalty. With an intermediate penalty, however, neither
oﬃcials nor the central authority can extract high rents at the expense of the other
so total corruption is therefore scarce. In other words, even if highly corrupt, an
independent judiciary has the beneﬁtt h a ti tc u r t a i l st h em o n o p o l yp o w e ro ft h ec e n t r a l
authority at the cost of creating opportunities for oﬃcials to seek rents.
In terms of the expected price level of the government good, a dependent judiciary
typically increases it because ex-post fees are high and theft rare. Consumers therefore
indirectly beneﬁt from an independent judiciary.7
We furthermore examine the implications of our model against empirical evidence.
We use unique data containing a variable capturing the degree of the dependency of
the judiciaries, which serve well as an approximation of the assumptions of our model.
The proxy we create is based on the US Department of State’s (and the Heritage
Foundation’s “Index of Freedom 2001”) evaluation of the degree to which the judiciary
is subject to inﬂuence from the executive authority.8 The results show that corruption
is positively associated with the dependency of the judiciary, which lends some support
to the earlier empirical literature.
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. The model takes its starting
point in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), but diﬀe r si nt h a tt h eo ﬃcials are exploited by the
6Similar to our ﬁndings, Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that com-
petition among oﬃcials reduces corruption at the lower level of government. This is also supported
by Gurgur and Shah (2000) in a cross-country analysis. However, we show that it can actually be
selected by a corrupt central authority to increase its revenues and that this choice is a function of
the structure of the judiciary.
7However, if competition among oﬃcials is selected when the judiciary is dependent but not when
it is independent, then a dependent judiciary generates a lower price.
8This diﬀers from La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov et al. (2002) who use legal origin as a proxy
for the dependency of the judiciary, La Porta et al. (2004) who use tenure of judges and whether
judicial decisions are a source of law as a proxy, and Ades and Di Tella (1997) who use an index from
Business International.
4central authority and that the judiciary is modeled.9 Becker and Stiegler (1974), and
later Carmichael (1985), have emphasized a mechanism of rent extraction similar to
ours in which some of the oﬃcials’ rents could accrue to the government if they were
required to post bonds up front. In our model, however, the up-front payment is not
a bond but a sunk cost.
Similar to our model, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that independent judiciaries
are vulnerable to taking bribes. While they focus on explaining why independent and
dependent judiciaries have come about (in 12th century England and France) we study
their aﬀect on the distributions of rents. Huther and Shah (2000) and Stephenson
(2001) ﬁnally argue that uncorrupted independent judiciaries reduce corruption. We
show in a micro-founded model that this may be true even if they are corrupt.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2 where we also
analyze diﬀerences between an independent and a dependent judiciary. Competition
among oﬃcials is considered in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we considered the welfare
aspects of the model and in section 2.6 we solve the model assuming a benevolent
central authority to compare with earlier literature. Section 3 considers some empirical
evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Micro-founded Model of Corruption
We consider the provision of a single homogeneous government-produced good, say a
permit. Consumers have a linear inverse demand for the permits, p(q)=a−bq,w h e r e
a and b are constants and q is the number of permits allocated by one oﬃcial. We
initially consider the case where permits are provided by a single government oﬃcial
who can constrain the quantity of permits. The central authority (CA) uses oﬃcials
to extract rents from consumers. The CA sells the oﬃces for up-front payments, and
demands a fee, θ ≥ 0, per permit sold, which is paid ex post.10 The CA is assumed to
9In Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the fee oﬃcials pay is a real exogenous cost to the government. In
our model, the fee is determined by the central authority in order to extract rents.
10Several studies show that valuable oﬃces are sold ﬁrst (Huntington 1968, Wade 1982, 1984,
Riordan 1995 and Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman 1997) after which the central authority often expects
5use an auction in which case it collects non-refundable bribes, x, from several potential
oﬃcials but only one oﬃcial gets the oﬃce.
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), oﬃcials can cover up the sale of permits but may
then get caught by the judiciary, i.e., the authority who can intervene and penalize
oﬃcials.11 The penalty, t, is independent of the amount of theft. This is motivated by
the empirical fact that the structure of law against corruption tends to be relatively
insensitive to the scale of corruption (see Banerjee 1995, 1996). The CA cannot take
more from a stealing oﬃcial than the oﬃcial’s ex-ante wealth, t.12 The decision whether
to monitor oﬃc i a l so rn o tf o raﬁxed cost c>0 and the size of the penalty are
determined by the CA in the case of a dependent judiciary and by the judiciary in the
case of an independent judiciary. The game is solved by backward induction starting
at stage three when the oﬃcial sells the permits.
2.1 Stage three: the market for permits
The proﬁto ft h eo ﬃcial is given by
π =( a − bq)q − θq (1)
where, θ, is the fee per permit determined by the CA and a > θ. The proﬁt maximizing












more payments in terms of variable fees (Wade 1982, 1984, Shleifer and Vishny 1993 and Djankov et
al. 2002).
11In theory, the CA would know how much is stolen even without the judiciary and hence would
do well without it. However, we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume that it cannot keep track of payments
and thus needs the judiciary as a bookkeeper. It may also be the case that the judiciary is needed to
verify theft. In addition, oﬃcial may steal and then promptly leave the position. To prevent this, the
CA needs to monitor the oﬃcial.
12Similarly, Polinsky and Shavell (2001) model an upper limit on the penalty representing the
lawbreaker’s maximum wealth.






where the superscript NT denotes a no theft case. In the case of theft the oﬃcial pays
no fee, i.e., θ =0 . Consequently, the proﬁt when issuing permits without paying the






However, while theft increases the proﬁts it also exposes the oﬃcial to the risk of getting
caught and penalized.
2.2 Stage two: The game between the judiciary and oﬃcials
At stage two, the theft, monitoring and penalty decisions are made. Consider ﬁrst
a dependent judiciary where the CA takes the monitoring decision and decides the
penalty.14
2.2.1 A dependent judiciary
The penalty if the judiciary is dependent is tD = t since the central authority is con-
strained only by limited liability on the part of the oﬃcial.15 The payoﬀs determining
13The results do not change qualitatively if we instead assume that the oﬃcial steals some fraction,
γ,o fπT,s u c ht h a tγπT >π NT.
14Note that the central authority and the judiciary coincide in this case.
15Our results do not change qualitatively if we instead allow the penalty to be a function of the
uncovered amount of corruption, and let the judiciary take the stealing oﬃcial’s ex-post wealth,
tD = t + a2
4b.




Theft πT − tD,t D − c πT, 0
No Theft πNT,θ q ∗(θ) − c πNT,θ q ∗(θ)
Figure 1. The Game between the Central Authority and the Oﬃcial.
We assume that πT − tD <π NT and that tD >cso there are no pure strategy
equilibria of the game. We later show that these are not restrictive assumptions.
We solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium that would make the CA indiﬀerent
between monitoring and not monitoring, and the oﬃcial indiﬀerent between stealing





Note that the higher penalty, the lower is the probability of theft.16The mixed strategy





T h eC A ’ se x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts from the fees are in equilibrium equal to
Π
F = μλ(tD − c)+( 1− μ)λ(θq
∗(θ) − c)+( 1− λ)(1 − μ)θq
∗(θ)=( 1− μ)q
∗(θ)θ.( 8 )
An interesting feature of this model is that the CA’s revenues from the penalty and
the cost of monitoring the oﬃcial cancel in equilibrium. This is because in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, the CA’s expected proﬁt has to be the same from monitoring and
16Goel & Rich (1989) and Goel and Nelson (1998) using US state data show that the probability
that oﬃcials take bribes decreases as the penalties for corruption increases.






which is identical to the case of no theft. The reason is that the oﬃcial in equilibrium
is made indiﬀerent between stealing and not stealing.
2.2.2 An independent judiciary
Consider instead an independent judiciary who takes the monitoring decision and de-
termines the size of the penalty, tI. Because it does not have to report theft to the
central authority, there are bargaining possibilities both between the CA and the judi-
ciary and between the judiciary and the oﬃcial. The surplus can be shared in diﬀerent
ways depending on bargaining power and preferences, etc. Our main result is not sen-
sitive to the particular assumptions we make. Assume, for simplicity, that the oﬃcial
has full bargaining power with the judiciary.17 T h eC Aw i l la n n o u n c ead i v i s i o no f
the surplus, such that the judiciary receives a share, s, of the maximum the central
authority can take, i.e., st. However, the CA may not (or may not be able) to commit
to its announcement.18To handle this, we let the CA be able to commit to this decision
with a probability, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, and ask what eﬀect the commitment problem has on
the division of the surplus, and hence on the penalty.19
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, t∗
I <t D = t ∀t when φ<1.
Proof. A stealing oﬃc i a l ,w h i c hh a sb e e nc a u g h tw i l la l w a y sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st o
bribe the judiciary not to report to the CA. The bribe will be equal to what the
judiciary expects to receive from the CA: sφt or lower depending upon bargaining
17The mechanism works as long as the judiciary does not have full bargaining power with the oﬃcial.
18Full commitment is a strong assumption since the CA has incentives to take as much as possible
from the judiciary ex post. Olson (2000) ﬁnds that commitment is diﬃcult since dictators often have
a short time horizon. Moreover, Bardhan (1997 p. 1325) writes: “This ability to credibly commit is
a feature of “strong” states that very few developing countries have.”
19To focus on how the structure of judiciaries aﬀect corruption we do not model the underlying
reasons for why the probability to commit is low or high.
9power between the judiciary and the stealing oﬃcial. Thus, knowing that theft will
never be reported, the CA’s only objective is to minimize theft, which it does when
s =1 .H e n c e ,t h eo ﬃcial will pay the judge at most φt in order not to report the theft
to the CA, which will be his penalty, t∗
I.
Thus, whenever the CA cannot commit with a probability equal to one it ends up
in a bad scenario with much theft and with no revenues from the judiciary.20 However,
we believe that this typically is one of the features of an independent judiciary.
T h eg a m eb e t w e e nt h eo ﬃcial and the judiciary is shown in Figure 2. We assume




Theft πT − t∗
I,t ∗
I − c πT, 0
No Theft πNT, −c πNT, 0
Figure 2. The Game between the Judiciary and the Oﬃcial.
This game is similar to Figure 1 with the diﬀerence that the penalty is t∗
I instead of
tD and that the judiciary does not obtain revenues when the oﬃcial does not steal. The
probability of theft and monitoring are identical to when the judiciary is dependent
apart from the fact that the penalty is diﬀerent. Importantly, because t∗
I <t D the
probability of theft is higher in the case of independent judiciary. This implies that
the CA’s revenues are lower in the case of independent judiciary compared to when the
judiciary is dependent. Nevertheless, from the perspective of stage 2 the oﬃcials proﬁts
is the same, πNT =
(a−θ)2
4b . The reason is that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
oﬃcial’s proﬁt from theft will be equal to the the proﬁt from no theft. Similarly, the
judiciary’s proﬁt from monitoring will be equal to the proﬁt in case of no monitoring.
In other words, the judiciary will, in equilibrium, not earn any revenues.
20We could assume that collusion between the oﬃcial and the judiciary could be detected by the CA
with some probability. Mookerjee and Png (1995) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) in related models
include such governmental monitoring. Such an extension would not change the qualitative results of
the model.
102.3 Stage one: the choice of oﬃcials and fees
At stage one, the CA sells the oﬃce and decides the level of the fee. We assume that
n identical potential oﬃcials compete for the oﬃce and that the CA uses the following





.( 1 0 )
The more (non-refundable) bribes, given by xi, potential oﬃcial i pays the CA up-front
relative to the bribes of all n potential oﬃcials, the higher is the probability to become





∗(θ) − xi (11)
with respect to the bribe where we know from before that π∗(θ) is the value of holding
oﬃce. Note that the proﬁt in the objective function is identical to the no-theft because
although actually implementing a mixed strategy, they expect ex ante the no-theft





∗(θ).( 1 2 )
Since the bribes are non-refundable, the CA’s income from bribes at the ﬁrst stage of






∗(θ).( 1 3 )
Note that as n →∞ ,n x ∗ → π∗(θ).
21This probability contest success function, originally used by Tullock (1980) for the analysis of
rent-seeking contests and subsequently widely used in that literature, does not necessarily maximize
the CA’s revenues. However, it may reﬂect reality fairly well when it is illegal to sell oﬃces. In
this case, the CA cannot openly announce any price mechanism, which would maximize revenues,
and therefore this may be a natural second best solution. In addition, bribes cannot be rebated to
those failing to receive the oﬃce, because then it would be clear that he was selling favors. Baye et
al. (1993) argue that this is exactly what happens in many lobbying campaigns. They write, “It is
natural, therefore, for a political institution to arise such that lobbyist “ante up” before the prize is
awarded, and these up-front payments are not refundable to those failing to win the prize” (Baye et
al. 1993, p. 289).
11An alternative setup is that the CA’s revenue is determined in a bargaining process
between the CA and potential oﬃcials. Since it is reasonable to assume that the CA’s
bargaining power increases in the number of potential oﬃcials, qualitatively our results
would remain in such a setting. Another example is if oﬃcials borrow in order to buy
the oﬃce and if they have private information about their interest rate, then a ﬁrst
price sealed bid auction yields an identical result. In fact, any mechanism with the
properties that the CA cannot extract the full value of the oﬃce, which is increasing
in the number of potential oﬃcials, would generate the basic insights of the model.22
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Figure 3. An Illustration of the Model.
In Figure 3 the model is illustrated. The demand for permits and the parameters n,
c and t, determines how much the CA can extract from oﬃcials. The CA’s problem is
to ﬁnd the fee, θ, that maximizes its proﬁt, Π, which consists of the up-front payments
n−1
n π∗(θ) and the incomes from fees (1 − c
t)θq∗(θ). Increasing the fee, θ,w i l li n c r e a s e
the CA’s revenues from fees. However, the cost is that oﬃcials’ expected proﬁt, π∗(θ),
is reduced, which reduces the CA’s incomes when selling the oﬃce.
We assume that the CA can commit to its ex-ante announcement of the fee. Thus,
22Eﬃcient menu auctions (see e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) would not, but they are only
possible if the potential oﬃcials can make negative contributions (Boylan 2000).













where the superscript M denotes monopoly. Note that t = t i nt h ec a s eo fad e p e n d e n t
judiciary and t = t∗




















).( 1 6 )
The fee is positive as long as t>n c .In the case of an independent judiciary, the fee is
positive if φt>n c .For example, if φ is very low, then it follows that the optimal fee









T.( 1 7 )
From equation (3) it is evident that the price of permits in case of theft is equal to
a


















)).( 1 8 )
We now turn to deﬁning the levels of corruption. First, we deﬁne petty corruption


















23We will assume a positive fee, i.e., that t>n c , which subsumes the earlier assumption t>c .
13Second, we deﬁne grand corruption as the CA’s proﬁt
G
C = Π
M.( 2 0 )
Third, and ﬁnally, total corruption is the sum of these two.
Consider how the dependency of the judiciary aﬀects the level of corruption.
Proposition 2 As compared to an independent judiciary, a dependent judiciary will
be associated with a higher optimal fee, a higher price level for the government good,




n2 +6 n − 7
4
cn.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is that the CA’s incomes (grand corruption) from fees are higher
in a dependent system due to the low probability of theft. Because of this, the CA
increases the fee, which, in turn, reduces petty corruption.24 Total corruption tends to
be reduced when the judiciary is dependent because fewer permits are issued. However,
the harsher the penalty the larger is the CA’s income, and for suﬃciently large penalties
this eﬀect dominates such that total corruption increases if the judiciary is dependent.
Interestingly, consumers indirectly beneﬁt from an independent judiciary. The reason
is that the CA is constrained, which leads it to select relatively low variable fees.
A related topic is the optimal choice of the structure of the judiciary (see Glaeser
and Shleifer 2002). In our model, we note that a corrupt CA would always select a
dependent judiciary to reduce theft.
24An alternative deﬁnition of petty corruption is that it equals the extent to which oﬃcials com-
mit theft, μ = c
t. Since a dependent judiciary implies that the penalty is higher compared to an
independent judiciary, the results on petty corruption would be similar under this assumption.
142.4 Competition among oﬃcials
Let us extend the analysis to encompass the possibility that several oﬃcials sell permits
in competition. From the CA’s point of view, the beneﬁt of competition is increased
sale of government goods. However, competition also reduces the oﬃcials’ willingness
to pay for the oﬃce along with decreasing the probability that the CA will receive the
payments ex post. We ask two questions. First, what are the eﬀects of competition
on the price level and on the levels of corruption? Second, what will be the optimal
number of oﬃcials chosen by the CA?
Assume there are N>1 identical oﬃcials selling the permit, that oﬃcials compete
in prices and the goods are perfect substitutes.25 The price, p = a − b
PN
i=1 qi, is in
equilibrium when nobody steals equal to the fee, θ,s ot h eq u a n t i t yp r o v i d e db yo n e





.( 2 1 )
The proﬁt without theft, or if more than one oﬃcial steals, is equal to zero. The
proﬁtf o ro ﬃcial i if only he steals is (θ − ε)a−θ
b where ε → 0. If somebody else steals,
then the proﬁto fo ﬃcial i is equal to zero. The game at stage two for oﬃcial i is shown
in Figure 4 where μj denotes the probability of theft by another oﬃcial j.W h e n
stealing, the probability that nobody else steals is equal to (1 − μj)N−1. We assume
that the penalty, t, is independent of the number of thieves and that the oﬃcials are




Theft (1 − μj)N−1 θ(a−θ)
b − t, t − c (1 − μj)N−1 θ(a−θ)
b , 0
No Theft 0, −c 0, 0
Figure 4. The Game between the Judiciary and Oﬃcials in Competition.
25Assuming that the products are diﬀerentiated (imperfect substitutes) gives results in similar di-
rection.
15We assume that t>(1 − μj)N−1 θ(a−θ)
b and t>c .Hence, the mixed strategy equi-
librium probability of theft is equal to μ = c
t and the mixed strategy equilibrium
probability of monitoring is equal to λ =
(1−μj)N−1 θ(a−θ)
b
t .26 Note that the expected
v a l u eo ft h eg a m ef o ra no ﬃcial is equal to zero as this is what he earns if he does not
















and the optimal number of oﬃc i a l si sg i v e nb y
N
∗ =2 ∀N>1.( 2 4 )
Note that θ
∗ and N∗ are independent of the judicial system when N>1.T h eC A ’ s







T.( 2 5 )
We use the same notation as before so πT = a2
4b denotes the monopoly value of theft.
The oﬃcials’ expected proﬁt of the game is equal to zero. The expected price level is
given by a








2).( 2 6 )
We now pose the question: under what conditions would the CA select competition
among oﬃcials?
26We here assume that the judiciary is independent. As in the monopoly case, in equilibrium, the
only diﬀerence to the case of a dependent judiciary is that the penalty is lower in the case of an
independent judiciary.
16Proposition 3 If t<2nc, then the CA chooses a monopoly. If t>2nc,t h e nt w o
oﬃcials will be chosen.










πT = ΠM.T h i s
simpliﬁes to the condition t>2nc.
When there is no theft (or if t = ∞) and when a monopoly can be sold for its
full value (or if n = ∞), then the CA is indiﬀerent between the two market forms
since both are ﬁrst best solutions. But when the penalty is high and the income from
up-front payments low, competition tends to be preferred. The reason is that fees,
which the CA fully relies on in competition, will often be collected and that the up-
front payments, which a monopoly partly relies on, will be equal to zero. More than
two oﬃcials is never preferred because all it does is increasing the CA’s probability of
e a r n i n gn op r o ﬁta ta l l .
This is an interesting result since the kind of competition that Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) argue should be imposed may well be a corrupt central authority’s choice. How-
ever, when the CA cannot penalize stealing oﬃcials harshly, he tends to grant monop-
olies instead. An example of this, which ﬁts neatly into our model, is that of feudal
Europe where the federal governments were so weak that they could not penalize oﬃ-
cials in provinces (Shleifer & Vishny 1993). As our model predicts the feudal European
kings consistently granted monopolies for rent extraction (see for example Swart 1980
and North 1981).
In the following we analyze the eﬀects of competition, ﬁrst on the price level, and
then on diﬀerent levels of corruption.
Proposition 4 The fee is higher, and the price lower, in competition compared to the
monopoly case. In competition, the price level is higher in case of a dependent judiciary
compared to an independent judiciary.
Proof. See Appendix A.
W ea r g u et h a tc o m p e t i t i o nh a st w oe ﬀects on the price level. First, because oﬃcials
undercut each other’s prices, it reduces the price level as argued by Shleifer & Vishny
17( 1 9 9 3 ) .S e c o n d ,s i n c et h ef e ei st h eo n l ys o u r c eo fi n c o m ef o rt h eC Ai tw i l lb es e th i g h .
In fact, the CA acts as a monopolist with a marginal cost equal to zero, that is, he
s e t st h ef e ee q u a lt oa
2.T h i si sa l s ot h ep r i c el e v e lw h e nn o tb o t ho ﬃcials steal, which
happens with probability 1 − (c
t)2. In all other cases, the price is equal to zero. Since
the probability of theft is not zero, the price level is always lower in competition than
in the monopoly case, where it is at least equal to a
2. As for a dependent judiciary
within competition, it leads to less theft and therefore to a higher expected price level,
just as in the monopoly case. The eﬀe c ti s ,h o w e v e r ,n o ta ss t r o n gi nt h em o n o p o l y
case since the fee is not aﬀected by the penalty.
Proposition 5 When t>(2+n+
p
n(n +4 ) ) cn, total corruption is higher in compe-
tition among oﬃcials than when one oﬃcial is selected. Competition eradicates petty
corruption. Within competition, a dependent judiciary leads to more grand corruption
than an independent judiciary does.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A harsher penalty leads to more grand corruption within competition because the
only eﬀect it has is to reduce the probability of theft. Similar to the Rose-Ackerman’s
(1978) and Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) theoretical analyzes we ﬁnd that competition
reduces petty corruption and the price level. However, we contrast their results with
the fact that competition may lead to more grand corruption than a monopoly would.27
Note that three cases can arise when we study how a dependent judiciary aﬀects
corruption. First, the penalty may be low enough, both in the case of an independent
and a dependent judiciary such that a monopoly is selected in both cases. Second,
the diﬀe r e n c ei nt h ep e n a l t ym a yb es u c ht h a tad e p e n d e n tj u d i c i a r yl e a d st oad i ﬀer-
ent institutional structure compared to the case of an independent judiciary. In the
independent case, monopoly is selected, whereas in the case of a dependent judiciary,
27Proposition 3 shows that, for the monopoly case, grand corruption might be higher in the case of
dependent judiciary compared to independent judiciary. When the number of oﬃcials is endogenous,
this is true in the case of competition, but no longer in the monopoly case. The reason is that
competition among two oﬃcials is selected in the penalty-parameter range when this was possible for
the monopoly case.
18competition is selected. Third, the penalty may be suﬃciently high so that the CA
will in both cases select competition. For large enough penalties, total corruption is
larger in competition among oﬃcials than in the monopoly case.
We now show an example where a = b = c =1and n =2 . Figure 5 illustrates how
the dependency of the judiciary aﬀects the price level. At t =4 ,t h eC As w i t c h e sf r o m
a monopoly to competition among oﬃcials.










Figure 5. The Dependency of the Judiciary and the Price Level.
Figure 6 illustrates how the dependency of the judiciary aﬀects corruption. The
thick grey line shows total corruption, the thin line grand corruption and the medium
thick line petty corruption.














Figure 6. The Dependency of the Judiciary and Corruption.
Note that when t ≥ 4 petty corruption is equal to zero and that grand corruption
therefore coincides with total corruption. It can be shown that for the threshold value
t =2 nc (when the CA is indiﬀerent between a monopoly and competition), total
corruption is always higher in the monopoly case. When switching from a monopoly
to competition (i.e. when t =2 nc), petty corruption is eradicated and total corruption
reduced. We can also observe that if the penalty is intermediate, then the level of total
corruption is low. An interpretation of this is that when the power between oﬃcials
and the CA is divided, total corruption is low. In a nutshell, this kind of competition
reduces the proﬁts of the CA and oﬃcials, which in this model is the same as reducing
corruption.
2.5 Welfare analysis
We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus, which is the value of the fees,
the rents from oﬃce, less monitoring costs. The penalty, t, constitutes a transfer from
stealing oﬃcials to the judiciary not aﬀecting social welfare. Thus, in the monopoly


















c.( 2 7 )
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is consumer surplus plus the value of the oﬃce
plus the value of the fees in the case when the oﬃcial does not steal. The second term
is consumer surplus plus the value of the oﬃc ei nt h ec a s eo ft h e f ta n dt h el a s tt e r mi s
the cost of monitoring. In the competition case, social welfare is equal to
W






















c.( 2 8 )
The ﬁrst term is consumer surplus if not both oﬃcials steal. The second term is
consumer surplus if both steal, the third term the value of fees if nobody steals and
the last term the cost of monitoring two oﬃcials.
L e tu sn o we x a m i n eh o ws o c i a lw e l f a r ei sa ﬀected by whether the judiciary is de-
p e n d e n to ri n d e p e n d e n to ft h eC A .W en o t et h a ti tm a yd e p e n do nt h ed e g r e eo f
competition among oﬃcials. The model gives the following results.
Proposition 6 In competition, a dependent judiciary is associated with more welfare
than an independent judiciary. In the monopoly case, the eﬀect is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix A.
First, consider the case of competition between two oﬃcials. Recall that if both
oﬃcials steal, then the price is driven down to zero. This eliminates the dead weight
loss. A dependent judiciary has two eﬀects on welfare. It reduces the probability of
theft, which reduces welfare because it increases the dead weight loss, and it reduces
the amount of monitoring, which increases welfare. In this model, the second eﬀect
dominates. Hence, in the case of competition, a dependent judiciary increases social
welfare.









Figure 7. The Dependency of the Judiciary and Welfare.
Second, in the monopoly case a dependent judiciary implies a high fee. This in-
creases the value of fees but reduces consumer surplus and the value of oﬃce. Because
the eﬀect on the probability of monitoring is ambiguous the total eﬀect is ambiguous
as well. In the above example, when a = b = c =1and n =2 , a dependent judiciary
reduces welfare in the monopoly case as shown in Figure 7. Even though we cannot in
general determine whether a monopoly generates more social welfare than competition
or not, it is possible to show that in the threshold (when t =2 nc) ,w e l f a r ei sa l w a y s
higher in the monopoly case.
Comparing with Figure 6, we note that the penalty aﬀects welfare in a similar way
as it aﬀects total corruption. This idea that corruption enables consumers to overcome
regulation is not new (see e.g. Leﬀ 1964 and Huntington 1968). Leﬀ (1964 p. 11),
for example, states “...if the government has erred in its decision, the course made
possible by corruption may well be the better one”. However, our analysis is partial
and there is a vast literature dealing with reasons for why corruption is negative (see
e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1978 and Shleifer and Vishny 1993).28
28Rose-Ackerman (1978) for example warns of the diﬃculty of limiting corruption to areas in which
it might be desirable. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also argue that the fact that corruption has to be
kept secret makes bureaucrats allocate resources to areas where there are opportunities for corruption
222.6 A benevolent CA
As discussed in the introduction, earlier literature has typically focused on corruption
at the lower level of government and has taken the highest level to be benevolent
(Shleifer & Vishny 1993 and Banerjee 1996). In order to enable comparison with this
literature, we will in this section assume that the CA is benevolent. We assume that
oﬃces are not sold and that the CA maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and the
revenues from fees less the monitoring cost. We also assume that the oﬃcials’ proﬁts
are not included in the welfare function because they are corrupt. This problem poses
an interesting trade-oﬀ. A low fee implies much consumer surplus. The cost of a low
fee, however, is that the surplus from the fee is low and that the cost of monitoring
oﬃc i a l si sh i g h .

















c.( 2 9 )










),( 3 0 )
where t>3c is a necessary condition for a positive solution. In equilibrium, welfare is
equal to W
∗ = 9c2−11ct+4t2
2t(3t−5c) πT. By comparing equation (16) and (30) we ﬁnd that the
optimal fee is higher for a benevolent CA than for a corrupt CA. The reason is the
following: a corrupt CA has incentive to reduce the fee because it earns a residual on
oﬃcials’ proﬁt. The benevolent CA has incentive to reduce the fee to increase consumer
surplus but an additional incentive to increase the fee to reduce the cost of monitoring
the oﬃcial. Therefore, the price level is higher and petty corruption is lower if the
CA’s is benevolent.
Because the judiciary is assumed to be corrupt, an independent judiciary will in
t h ec a s eo ft h e f tb a r g a i nw i t ht h eo ﬃcial, which leads to a low penalty. Therefore,
the probability of theft is high and the CA selects a low fee. Hence, an independent
and the social cost of this “can vastly exceed bribe revenues” (1993, p. 614).
23judiciary leads to much petty corruption and a low price compared to a dependent
judiciary, also if the CA is benevolent.
In competition, there is as before no reason to use more than two oﬃcials. Social
welfare consists of four terms: consumer surplus if not both oﬃcials steal plus consumer
surplus if both steal plus incomes from fees if nobody steals less the cost of monitoring



























c.( 3 1 )
The utility is unambiguously decreasing the higher the fee is, so the solution is
simply θ
∗ =0 .29 Note the diﬀerence from the monopoly case where oﬃcials would earn
large proﬁts when the fee is equal to zero. Interestingly, our theory resembles Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) in that competition will be chosen by a
benevolent authority, who minimizes corruption.30
3 Discussion
Using a new data set, which resembles the features of our model, we here consider a sim-
ple linear speciﬁcation of the model in order to empirically study how the dependency
of the judiciary is associated with corruption and the price level.
3.1 Data
To measure petty and grand corruption we use the “Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perception Index 2001”, which includes both in the same variable. Corruption
is computed as an average of diﬀerent surveys assessing each countries performance
ranging from 10 “highly corrupt” to 0 “perfectly clean” and is labelled CORR.31 Ob-
29If the oﬃcials’ proﬁts would also be included in the social welfare function, then the solution
would, independent of market structure, be identical to the case of competition. The reason being
t h a tt h eC A ’ so n l yo b j e c t i v ei st or e d u c et h ed e a dw e i g h tl o s s .
30However, in competition, the judiciary becomes irrelevant as the fee is equal to zero and there is
n o t h i n gt os t e a l .
31The scale has been reversed from the index in which 0 indicated the highest level of corruption.
24servations from 79 countries are reported. The source for the price level is the World
Business Environment Survey 1997 ”Measuring Conditions for Business Operation and
Growth” from the World Bank. The obtained country averages are from ﬁrm level data.
To capture the price level of governmental goods we use the question: “When ﬁrms
in your industry do business with the government, how much of the contract value must
they oﬀer in additional or unoﬃcial payments to secure the contract?”. An index of 6
indicates a price above 20 percent of the value and 1 indicates a price equal to zero.
T h el a b e lf o rt h i sv a r i a b l ei sP R I C E .T h e r ea r e4 3o b s e r v a t i o n sf o rP R I C E .
In the model we deﬁne the judiciary as being dependent if the CA can decide the
penalty for theft and make the monitoring decision. In order to capture this, we have
compiled an index based on the US Department of State’s evaluation of the degree
to which the judicial system is subject to inﬂuence from the executive authority, as
shown in the World Heritage Foundation’s ”Index of freedom” from 2001. We have
constructed a scale where 1 implies “totally independent”, 2 corresponds to “generally
independent but occasionally inﬂuenced by the executive”, 3 implies “the judiciary often
shows signs of dependence of the executive” and 4 represents “the judiciary is subject
to inﬂuence”. The index is denoted by DEP and observations from 79 countries are
reported.
We ﬁnally control for other potential determinants of corruption. According to La
Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov et al. (2002), GNP per capita, the absolute value of
the latitude of the country and the religions Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam may
help explain corruption, bureaucratic delays and regulation. We therefore control for
these variables (logGNP, LAT, PROT, CATH and MUSLIM).32 La Porta et al. (1999)
and Djankov et al. (2002) also argue that countries that have adopted civil law and
socialistic law tend to have more dependent judiciaries and also more corruption than
countries using common law. As we use a diﬀerent proxy for the dependency of the
judiciary we do not include legal origin in our regressions.33 Djankov et al. (2002)
32logGNP denotes the logarithm of GNP per capita for the period 1970-1995. The source for the
control variables is La Porta et al. (1999).
33Including legal origin as a control does not change our results qualitatively.
25use political rights as a potential explanatory variable of corruption in the form of
regulation of entry of ﬁrms. We therefore control for political rights (POL) as well.34
The source for this variable is Freedom House (2000-2001). In Appendix Table B1,
average values of the variables included in the regressions are shown.
The simple model speciﬁcation for corruption is
CORRi = α + βDepi + ϕjXij +  i,( 3 2 )
and similarly for the price
PRICE i = α + βDepi + ϕjXij +  i,( 3 3 )
where Xij captures the control variables.
3.2 Regression results
The theoretical model gives diﬀerent predictions of judicial dependency on corruption
depending on the judiciary’s ability to punish stealing oﬃcials (see Figure 6 for an
illustration of these results). A dependent judiciary leads to more grand but less petty
corruption. For low levels of the punishment (when a monopoly is selected) the overall
eﬀect is a reduction in corruption whereas for harsh punishments (when competition
is selected) total corruption is enhanced. In the empirical estimations, a clear positive
relationship between corruption and the dependency of the judiciary is found, as shown
in Appendix Table B2, ﬁrst controlling for logGNP, latitude, and then adding religion
and ﬁnally political rights. According to the model, there may be two explanations for
this. Either the capacity of dependent judiciaries to punish is relatively strong, or grand
corruption is simply over reported in the perception index.35 In both cases, corruption
and dependency of the judiciary are positively associated.
34Another standard control variable is civil rights. As it is highly correlated with political rights we
do no report this variable. However, the results are robust to its inclusion.
35In fact, grand corruption may well be overreported since media usually reports this kind of cor-
ruption.
26Next, recall that the model predicts a dependent judiciary to generate high price
levels both with a monopoly and with competition among oﬃcials. However, as a
dependent judiciary may also lead to a shift to competition, the overall eﬀect is am-
biguous. The simple empirical speciﬁcation allows for a ﬁrst interpretation of the
positive correlation between the dependency of the judiciary and the price level of gov-
ernment goods. In Appendix Table B3 the basic regression results are reported. By
testing the relationship between PRICE and DEP we ﬁnd that a dependent judiciary is
associated with higher price levels than an independent judiciary and that the results
are robust to the inclusion of standard regressors, such as the logarithm of GNP per
capita, religion and political rights. According to the model, this would imply there is
no structural shift in the degree of competition.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
As a check for robustness, we also use another proxy for the dependency of the judicia-
ries, developed by Feld and Voigt (2003). In a worldwide survey, they have evaluated
whether judiciaries “de facto” are dependent or not. De facto dependence is captured
by an index consisting of the following ﬁve elements: (i) a short eﬀective average term
length of the members of the highest court, (ii) few judges in the highest court, (iii)
small budgets for the courts, (iv) frequent changes of the legal rules, and (v) if the
decisions of the highest court, in order to be implemented, depend on some action of
other branches of the government. The number of observations is 46 and we label the
variable DEP2.
As shown in Appendix Table B4, we obtain the same results with DEP2 as with
DEP. A dependent judiciary is positively associated with corruption when controlling
for logGDP, latitude, religion and political rights. Appendix Table B5 ﬁnally shows
that also this measurement of a dependent judiciary is positively associated with the
price level controlling for the same variables as in Appendix Table B3. However, it
should be noted that there are only 28 observations included.
274 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper addresses the issue of how the dependency of the judiciary aﬀects cor-
ruption. It has been argued that when oﬃcials are corrupt, so are often the central
authority and the judiciary. Understanding the interdependence of the central author-
ity, lower level oﬃcials and the judiciary helps to explain how the institutional design
of corrupt governments aﬀects corruption. Owing to this interaction, low- and high-
level corruption, along with the price citizens have to pay for government goods, are
typically aﬀected diﬀerently by institutional design. Our results may be summarized
as follows.
At the core of the distinction between an independent and a dependent judiciary lies
the fact that independence gives rise to possibilities of bargaining when the judiciary
is corrupt. We argue that the central authority can use a dependent judiciary to
avoid bargaining between oﬃcials and the judiciary. By means of this control, theft
by oﬃcials is reduced by increasing the judiciary’s penalizing capacity. Consequently,
the central authority can extract more rents (high-level corruption) at the expense of
oﬃcials, which implies little low-level corruption.
The basic role of an independent judiciary, even if corrupt, is that it dissolves
the exclusive power of the central authority, which reduces high-level corruption. On
the other hand if the judiciary is too weak in the bargaining with oﬃcials, low-level
corruption will be extensive. In other words, when power is divided among oﬃcials,
the judiciary and the central authority, no agent will be able to create large rents, and
thereby reducing total corruption. Examining a new data set of the dependency of
the judiciary we achieve results supporting earlier empirical literature in that a more
dependent judiciary is associated with more corruption.
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32AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of Proposition (2)
The penalty is equal to tD in a dependent system and tI = φtD in an independent
system where φ<1. The expected price level is higher in the dependent case for
two reasons. A higher penalty implies less theft, since μ = c
t. This implies that the
probability that the price is a+θ
2 rather than a
2 is higher. Also, as shown below, a







n − 2(1 − c
t))2t2 > 0.( 3 4 )
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The eﬀect on overall corruption is
∂TC
∂t










The other root is not feasible in equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Proposition (4)
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33which is less than the fee in competition a
2 when θ
∗ > 0. The price in the monopoly
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which is larger than the highest possible price in competition, a
2,w h e nθ
∗ > 0.F i -
nally, because the penalty is higher in case of a dependent judiciary compared to an










is higher in the dependent case.
A.3 Proof of Proposition (5)


























n )2 c (the other root is not feasible in equilibrium). Moreover, Bertrand
competition eradicates the oﬃcials’ expected proﬁts and hence petty corruption. As for
the last part of the proposition, a dependent judiciary leads to more overall corruption







T > 0.( A 1 2 )
A.4 Proof of Proposition (6)
The equilibrium welfare in competition is equal to
W




















c).( A 1 3 )







t3 > 0.( A 1 4 )
In the monopoly case, the eﬀect of the independence of the judiciary on the cost of
monitoring oﬃc i a l si sa m b i g u o u s .
35B Appendix










logGNP 7.62 7.61 7.99 7.94
(1.34) (1.08) (1.25) (0.95)
LAT 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.33
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
PROT 14.81 % 5.95 % 12.36 % 7.05 %
CATH 38.18 % 51.62 % 44.88 % 59.12 %
MUSLIM 14.51 % 14.54 % 11.47 % 10.80 %
OTHER 32.50 % 27.89 % 31.29 % 23.03 %
POL 2.67 2.56 2.28 2.29
(1.98) (1.78) ('1.73) (1.56)
 # Obs. 79 43 46 28
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
36Appendix Table B2 Results from OLS regression model on corruption using DEP              





























R-squared 0,6665 0,7552 0.7555
 # Obs. 79 79 79
Note: White-corrected standad errors below coefficients. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level, 
b at 5 percent and c at 10 percent.
37  Appendix Table B3 Results from OLS regression model on the price level using DEP       

































R-squared 0,5518 0,6325 0.6453
 # Obs. 43 43 43
Note: White-corrected standad errors below coefficients. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level, 
b at 5 percent and c at 10 percent.
38Appendix Table B4 Results from OLS regression model on corruption using DEP2            





























R-squared 0.6684 0.7534 0.7537
 # Obs. 46 46 46
Note: White-corrected standad errors below coefficients. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level, 
b at 5 percent and c at 10 percent.
39Appendix Table B5 Results from OLS regression model on the price level using DEP2






























R-squared 0,5936 0.6126 0.6285
 # Obs. 28 28 28
Note: White-corrected standad errors below coefficients. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level, 
b at 5 percent and c at 10 percent.
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